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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
0. A. TANGREN, ETC., \ 
vs. 
ADELINE M. INGALLS 124252 
ADELINE M. INGALLS 
vs. Case No. 
A~fERICAN SAVINGS & LOAN 9297 
ASS'N, et al 124797 
ADELINE M. INGALLS 
vs. 
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAV-
INGS & LOAN ASS'N, et al 124798 
PETITION FOR RE-HEARING AND BRIEF OF 
RESPONDENT IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
PETITION FOR RE-HEARING 
Comes now Adeline M. Ingalls, the respondent here-
in, and respectfully moves this court for a re-hearing in 
this case upon the grounds hereinafter set forth. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent relies on no facts other than as set forth 
in the Opinion of the court, field November 30, 1961. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT I 
THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES TO A JOINT TENANCY 
AGREEMENT IS IN GREATER JEOPARDY UNDER THE 
RULE OF 'THE MAJORITY OPINION THAN IF THE RULE 
OF LONG STANDING WERE APPLIED. 
POINT II 
THE RULE OF THE MAJORITY OPINION HAS NO 
APPLICATION TO THE CASE AT BAR. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES TO A JOINT TENANCY 
AGREEMENT IS IN GREATER JEOPARDY UNDER THE 
RULE OF THE MAJORITY OPINION THAN IF THE RULE 
OF-LONG STANDING WERE APPLIED. 
Unfortunately, an infallible method of determining 
intent has not been folmd. The majority opinion holds 
that the rebuttable rule is more desirable than the conclu-
sive rule. With this we respectfully disagree and earnest-
ly contend the opposite to be true. 
The argument of the majority opinion in support 
of the rebuttable rule· is three-fold: 1. Unlikelihood of 
contest if the agreen1ent states the true intent. 2. High 
quality of evidenc.e required to overcome the presump-
tion. 3. Protection of the ''Dead Man Statute.'' The 
fallacy of such argument is tha.t the dead man statute 
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is more likely to defeat the intention of the parties than 
to protect it, for the statute precludes the "other party" 
to the agreement, as in the instant case, from testifying 
to matters equally within her knowledge and that of the 
deceased. Thus, the court is deprived of the testimony 
of the person who is Inost likely to know of the intent o.f 
the parties. 
The quality of proof required to overcome the pre-
sumption is characterized by the majority op·inion as a 
~ 
"defensive shield" but the "shield'' loses much of its 
defensive character without the testimony of the "other 
party" to the agreement. Evidence produced to rebut the 
preswnption might be considered sufficient in the absence 
of the testimony of the "other p·arty,'' but ins.ufficient 
when considered with evidence of the "other party," were 
he not prohibited from testifying by the dead man stat-
ute. 
The n1ajority states that if the intent 'vas in fact to 
create a joint tenancy, a contest thereof would be rare. 
Obviously, such is not true under the rebuttable rule, 
for the rebuttable rule is tantamount to an open invita-
tion for designing persons to contest the agreement. 
The conclusive rule is criticized by the majority on 
the ground that it presupposes the intent of the deceased 
and in some instances may not give effect to true intent. 
In answer to this we submit that rather than to hazard 
defeat of the true intent of the deceased by reason of the 
inherent difficulties of the rebuttable rule, the court 
should be confined to the agreement itself to determine 
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intent. In order to correct the r"<are. instance. in which the 
joint tenancy agreement may not express true intent, the 
majority has set up a rule which by reason of its infirmi-
ties endangers the true intent of all such agreements. 
Justice is achieved under the conclusive rule, for in most 
cases the true intent of the parties will be carried out, 
and even the rare exception finds legal justification for 
it gives effect to the express intent. Evaluation of the 
two rules emphasizes the wisdom of retaining the conclu-
sive rule which has been the law of this jurisdiction for 
many years. 
POINT II 
THE RULE OF THE MAJORITY OPINIO·N HAS NO 
APPLICATION TO THE CASE AT BAR. 
The rule of the case, as stated by the majority, is as 
follows: 
. . . where there is a written agreement of 
joint tenancy with right of surVivorship, there is 
a presumption of validity and it will be given ef-
fect unless it is successfully attacked for fraud, 
mistake, incapacity, or other infirmity, or unless 
it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that 
the parties intended otherwise; and further, that 
such rule is applicable whether the parties are 
living or where death has intervened. 
If the majority of the court is determined to discard 
a rule of long standing, and, in its stead adopt the one 
quoted above with its attendant infirmities, such has no 
application to the case at bar and does not warrant a re-
versal of the judgment. The rule itself, indeed the entire 
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5 
opinion of the majority, emphasizes the intention of the 
parties. On Page 5 of the Opinion allegations of the com-
plaint are quoted, follo"\\ring which is the statement, "The 
foregoing allegations appear to be sufficie~t to provide 
a foundation to receive evidence a.s to what the intent of 
the parties was and their relationship to the fund at 
the tilne of the creation of the account." (Emphasis ours.) 
The complaint is barren of allegations of intent of .the 
parties. Allegations of intent therein are of one of the 
parties only. Allegations of ownership~ of the account, 
lack of contribution thereto by survivor, lack of any in-
debtedness owing by deceased to survivor, and subs.equent 
gift of a portion of the fund by deceased to survivor· are 
not allegations of intent. Although reeognized to be in 
disrepute by the majority, Holt v. Bayles, 85 Utah 364, 39 
Pac. 2d 715, contains a statement as follows: "We do not 
regard the questions of original ownership of the money 
as controlling under the particular facts of this case.'' 
Appellant was afforded op·portunity to amend in 
the lower court, but he elected to stand on the complaint 
as filed. Had facts other than those alleged existed, ap-
pellant would undoubtedly have amended the comp·laint. 
4\lthough the right of a litigant to offer proof should be 
safeguarded, where a pleading is wholly lacking in allega-
tion of fact, which if proved would entitle him to relief 
under the law, there is no injustice in granting s1unmary 
judgment. Such is the case at bar. 
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CONCLUSION 
The majority rule places the intent of the parties in 
jeopardy, invites litigation, tends to promote injustice, 
and has no application to the case at bar. We respect-
fully urge the court to re-affirm the rule of long stand-
ing in this State, or if the rule of the majority is retained, 
to detennine it inapplicable to the case at bar and to 
affirm the judgment of the tri.al CO"D:~t. 
Respectfully submitted, 
.. 
HAROLD R. BOYER 
RO!INEY, BOYER AND RONNOW 
·Attorneys for Respondent 
1409 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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